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Abstract
The article proposes to critically discuss the concept of 
fiscal democracy as operationalized by the means of the 
Steuerle-Roeper Index. It is assumed that the contempo-
rary sociohistorical context comprises a scenario of crisis 
or decline of democracies, largely explained by the fis-
cal difficulties faced by the States. The Fiscal Democracy 
Index is discussed as a promising scientific contribution 
for the attribution of empirical tangibility to such a re-
ality. However, a difficulty is identified concerning the 
non-consideration of fundamental rights as condition for 
the possibility of democratic politics. Finally, an example 
from the Brazilian constitutional system is presented in 
order to illustrate the article´s theoretical argument.
 
Keywords: fundamental rights; fiscal democracy; fiscal 
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Resumo
O artigo propõe-se a discutir criticamente o conceito de 
democracia fiscal, tal como operacionalizado por meio do 
Índice Steuerle-Roeper. Assume-se que o contexto sócio-
-histórico contemporâneo compreende um cenário de crise 
ou declínio das democracias, amplamente explicado pelas 
dificuldades fiscais enfrentadas pelos Estados. O Índice de 
Democracia Fiscal é discutido como uma contribuição cien-
tífica promissora para a atribuição de tangibilidade empíri-
ca a esta realidade. Contudo, identifica-se uma dificuldade, 
concernente à não consideração dos direitos fundamentais 
como condições de possibilidade da política democrática. 
Finalmente, um exemplo proveniente do sistema constitu-
cional brasileiro é apresentado para fins de ilustrar o argu-
mento teórico do artigo.
Palavras-chave: direitos fundamentais; democracia fis-
cal; rigidez fiscal; Índice Steuerle-Roeper; constitutionalist 
criticism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social conflict over public finances is central to the sociogenesis of the modern 
State1. Thus, the construction of bridges between the theory of fundamental rights and 
democratic theory, from the socio-fiscal perspective2, is promising for both subdisci-
plines. Moved by this spirit, this article critically discusses an increasingly influential 
concept in contemporary political theory, in the light of conceptions shared by liberal 
and deliberationist streams of constitutional and democratic theory regarding the nor-
mative restraint of political-decision-making processes. The argument that is intended 
is that, contrary to what is shown in the literature associated with the concept of fiscal 
democracy3, the constitutional rules that  establish forms of budgetary rigidity do not 
necessarily imply the mitigation of democratic political processes. More specifically, the 
theoretical problem to be solved is formulated in the following question: are the theo-
retical bases of the notion of fiscal democracy and the index that algebraically operatio-
nalizes it compatible with the relationship between democracy and law inscribed in the 
liberal and deliberationist streams of contemporary constitutionalism?
To clarify this question, the second section, presented bellow, indicates how de-
mocratic theory and contemporary constitutionalism are anchored in the public finance 
1  See: SCHUMPETER, J. The Crisis of the Tax State. In: SWEDBERG, R. (Org.). Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Eco-
nomics and Sociology of Capitalism Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991, p. 99 – 140; GOLDSCHEID, Rudolf. A Socio-
logical Approach to Problems of Public Finance. In: MUSGRAVE, Richard; PEACOCK, Alan T (Org.). Classics in 
the Theory of Public Finance. London: MacMillan, 1958, p. 202-213; HOFFMAN, Phillip T; NORBERG, Kathryn 
Norberg. Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government: 1450-1789. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994, p. 
1-7; TILLY, Charles. State, Taxes and Proletarians. CRSO Working Papers, [s.l.], vol. 213, 1980, p. 17-22. Disponí-
vel em: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50987/213.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; 
ELIAS, Norbert.  The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Malden:  Blackwell 
Publishing, 2000, p.344-362; MARTIN, Isaac Willian; MHEROTRA. Ajay K; PRASAD; Monica. The Thunder of His-
tory. In: MARTIN, Isaac Willian; MHEROTRA. Ajay K; PRASAD; Monica (Org.). The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation 
in Comparative and Historical Perspective. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 1-28.
2  BACKHAUS, Jürgen G. Fiscal Sociology: What for? In: BACKHAUS, Jürgen G.; WAGNER, Richard E (Org.). 
Handbook of Public Finance. London: Springer, 2002. p. 521-542.
3  STEUERLE, Eugene. Restoring Fiscal Democracy. The Milken Institute Review, 1st Quarter, 2016, p. 26-35. 
Disponível em: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/80326/2000781-Restoring-Fiscal-Demo-
cracy.pdf. Acesso em: 10 de julho de 2017. STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. An Index of Fiscal Democracy, 
MPIFG Working Paper, [s.l.], vol. 10, n. 03, abr. 2010, p. 6-8. Available at:  https://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/
wp10-3.pdf; GENSCHEL, Philipp; SCHWARZ, Peter. Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy. In: STREECK, W; 
SCHÄFER, A. (Org.). Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 59-83. p. 59-83.
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field. The third section then discusses the decline or atrophy of democratic regimes 
in the global context after the 2008 crisis and introduces the Fiscal Democracy Index 
(or Steuerle-Roeper Index)4, as proposed by Steuerle5 in the United States of America 
and applied in Germany by Streeck and Mertens6, as a potentially promising tool in the 
empirical measurement of the phenomenon. The fourth section, in turn, suggests that 
despite the unambiguous methodological and empirical performance associated with 
the Fiscal Democracy Index, its theoretical foundations severely compromise the goal 
of algebraic synthesizing of the atrophy of democratic regimes. These shortcomings 
will be observed under the premise – shared between liberal and deliberationist con-
ceptions of constitutionalism – that there is a complementarity between fundamental 
rights and democracy that can, on occasion, support the linking or pre-allocation of 
expenditure in public budgets. Finally, before the final considerations, I present a case 
of compatibility between compulsory spending and democratic decision-making, ex-
tracted from the Brazilian social security legal regime.
2. THE FISCAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRACY AND FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS
The main theories of democracy established throughout the twentieth century, 
as well as a significant portion of contemporary constitutionalist thinking, are anchored 
in elements linked to public finances. The following examples – pointillist and lacking 
in systematization – justify this premise, from which arises the problem that drives the 
theoretical research reported here.
Contemporary democratic theory has as its axis or gravitational framework 
the work of J. Schumpeter, in which subsequent contributions tend to establish rela-
tionships of ratification, complementation, or criticism.7 What is less discussed in the 
literature is the fact that the procedural and methodological notion of democracy 
formulated by the Triesch-born economist8 corresponds to a state idea based on the 
essential tax relation established between the subject as taxpayers and the sovereign 
power as collector.
4  The index is named after economists Eugene Steuerle and Timothy Roeper. Only the first one, however, 
signs the publications on the subject, in which it is reported that he contributed to the creation of the index.
5  STEUERLE, Eugene. Restoring Fiscal Democracy. The Milken Institute Review, 1st Quarter, 2016, p. 26-35. 
Disponível em: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/80326/2000781-Restoring-Fiscal-Demo-
cracy.pdf. Acesso em: 10 de julho de 2017.
6  STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. An Index of Fiscal Democracy, MPIFG Working Paper, [s.l.], vol. 10, 
n. 03, abr. 2010.  Disponível em https://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp10-3.pdf, p. 59-83.
7  SHAPIRO, Ian.  The State of Democratic Theory. In: KATZNELSON, Ira; MLNER, Helen V. (Org.). Political Sci-
ence: State of the Discipline. New York: Norton, 2002, p. 235-236.
8  SCHUMPETER, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper Perennial, 2008.
FRANCISCO MATA MACHADO TAVARES
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 161-183, jan./abr. 2021.164 
In 1918, under declared influence of the sociology of public finance launched by 
Goldscheid9, Schumpeter formulated the idea that the modern state would be better 
defined as a Tax State. From examples linked mainly to Prussian history, it was pointed 
out that the processes of states consolidation and control of the respective rulers (histo-
rical anteroom of democratization) obeyed conflicts referred to in the state collection. 
The tax relation has been postulated as the “thunder of history,” from which all symbolic 
and material aspects of societies could be explained, either causally or symptomati-
cally.10 In short, the primal reference of contemporary democratic theory is the work 
of the same thought and creative flow that laid the foundations of fiscal sociology and 
gave public finance a central role in explaining political relations and conflicts in advan-
ced capitalism.
A second and relevant example is to be found in Anthony Downs’s work, whose 
content has greatly influenced contemporary studies of political science by presenting 
an effort to transpose the method and theoretical framework of neoclassical economics 
into the framework of political relations in representative democracies. Anchored in 
ideas such as “personal interest axiom” and “utility calculations” as driving forces of ac-
tion in society, Downs presents a procedural notion of democracy, in which the central 
element, explicitly mentioned in seven of the eight conditions for a democratic gover-
nment listed by the author, lies in elections.”.11
Although the book “An Economic Theory of Democracy” receives considerable 
attention in the literature –  to this day still informing theoretical and empirical studies 
with their considerations on electoral behavior, logic of governmental action and defi-
nition of democratic governments – that fact that soon after its publication Downs had 
complemented it is often overlooked. In an article published in the World Politics in 
1960, the author used his theoretical and methodological toolkit to present two ideas 
that tie his democratic theory to the scope of public finance:
i. Downs has stated that the way governments make their spending, once re-
ferenced in the scope of raising votes in the upcoming elections, relates to 
the electorate’s perceptions of the impact that taxation has on their lives 
in relation to the benefits they perceive from the actions of the state. Taxes 
and budgets would, in effect, be the skeleton of electoral processes and the 
actions of incumbents in power.
ii. Even more emphatically, the political theorist concludes that “each national 
election can be considered a contest between two prospective government 
9  GOLDSCHEID, Rudolf. A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public Finance. In: MUSGRAVE, Richard; PEA-
COCK, Alan T (Org.). Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London: MacMillan, 1958, p. 202-213.
10  SCHUMPETER, J. The Crisis of the Tax State. In: SWEDEBERG, Richard (Org.). Joseph A. Schumpeter: The 
Economics and Sociology of Capitalism.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991, p. 99-140.
11  DOWNS, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957, p. 23-24.
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budgets”.12 This argument is of unique relevance to a debate on fiscal rigidity. 
Now, if democracy corresponds to elections and these to budgetary fluctua-
tions, then it is worth discussing the hypothesis that policies of fiscal rigidity 
mitigate the scope for public spending to obliquely affect or even nullify the 
meaning of electoral disputes, so as to make the democratic regime itself 
unfeasible.
Public finances also feature prominently in critical and normative theories about 
democracy. As with orthodox and descriptive variants, this trait is not usually noted 
with the expected prominence. Take, for example, the theory of deliberative democra-
cy, which in its origin largely constitutes a Habermasian response to the socio-historical 
context named by the Frankfurt philosopher, even in his writings of the 1970s, “legi-
timation crisis in late capitalism.” This crisis would occur in countries that established 
welfare states in Western Europe, in the midst of which it had been proven politically 
difficult over time to resolve the tension between capitalism and democracy with the 
arrangement that “is supposed to raise the requisite amount of taxes by skimming off 
profits and income and to use the available taxes so rationally that crisis-ridden distur-
bances of growth can be avoided”.13 If the prelude to deliberative democracy was the 
Habermasian diagnosis of a fiscal crisis demanding additional legitimacy for taxation, 
the present moment of the author’s philosophical-political production focuses on the 
problems of the European Union. It, according to Habermas, would be hijacked by an 
undemocratic technocracy. The proposed solution, as if rediscovering the problem of 
previous decades, would be found in three elements, all somewhat associated with pu-
blic finances, which should be democratically coordinated throughout the Old Conti-
nent: (i) fiscal, economic and monetary policy; (ii) budget policy, and; (iii) public debt.14 
The socio-historical diagnosis in which deliberative democracy flourishes, therefore, 
refers to the centrality of fiscal issues, both at their earliest origin and today.
Another example deserves mention before addressing the relationship betwe-
en constitutionalism and taxation. Studies on the history of democracies, especially 
on democratization and de-democratization processes, are centrally referenced in as-
pects such as taxes and budgets, especially with regard to the need for those under 
the jurisdiction to acquiesce to increasing revenue, in order to enable expenditures 
worthy of the efforts of wars or conquests in which National States were born.15 The 
most influential reference in explaining the mechanisms that inform the birth and fall 
12  DOWNS, Anthony. Why the Government Budget is too Small in a Democracy. World Politics, [s.l.], vol. 12, 
n. 4, p. 541-563, 1960, p. 545.
13  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Legitimation Crisis. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. p. 62.
14  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Lure of Technocracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, p. 9.
15  HOFFMAN, Phillip T; NORBERG, Kathryn Norberg. Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government: 
1450-1789. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994, p. 299-312.
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of democracies in comparative experience, Charles Tilly, focuses closely on the conflicts 
associated with state extraction, the most notable of which being taxation. The author 
asserts that extraction “opens the way to new citizen-state bargains that subject states 
to public politics and facilitate popular influence over public politics. To that extent it 
promotes democratization over the long run”16 . Extractive demands of states would 
operate according to cycles of intervention – resistance – repression – bargaining / 
democratization.17
The examples above are enough to justify the argument that taxation is, in the 
history of modern democracy and the theories aimed at justifying or depicting it, more 
than an incidental element. A similar line of reasoning can be lent to fundamental ri-
ghts, which are quintessential pillars of contemporary state in the same degree that 
democracy is.  Notwithstanding this common “tax-dependence”, the connections be-
tween rights and taxes are not so linear or clear as they are with democracy. In fact, dif-
ferent theoretical approaches to the nature and types of fundamental rights could lead 
to a comprehension of tax that oscilates from an intrusion on property against which 
the first constitutional guarantees had emerged, to an apparently antagonistic view, 
regarding taxation as necessary condition for the rights effectiveness. 
A traditional and still influential stream of the theoretical production devoted to 
contemporary constitutional law supports a typology of fundamental rights according 
to which there would be “positive” or “prestational” norms demanding state actions and 
expenditures, alongside “negative” or “defensive” precepts, whose deontological sense 
would lie in the wake of the anti-absolutist auspices that drove the eighteenth-cen-
tury revolutions into omissions and not state interventions. Ran Hirschl thus summa-
rizes this distinction:  “negative rights consist of fundamental freedoms (like freedom 
of speech, religious tolerance, freedom from arbitrary arrest and so on). Positive rights 
traditionally consist, inter alia, of social rights such as the universal right to services 
meeting basic human needs (e.g., health care, basic housing, education, social securi-
ty and welfare, and an adequate standard of living). The term “positive rights” is often 
used to describe these basic social rights, since they require the state to act positively 
to promote the well-being of its citizens, rather than merely refraining from acting”18.
The cleavage between prestational and defense rights could be problematic 
from the perspective of public finances. Positive rights would rely on tax revenues and, 
in some sense, the more the state could collect from its citizens, the more resources to 
16  TILLY, Charles. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 142.
17  TILLY, Charles Tilly. Extraction and Democracy. In: MARTIN, Isaac Willian; MHEROTRA. Ajay K; PRASAD; Moni-
ca (Org.). The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective. New York: Cambridge 
UP, 2009, p. 173-182.
18  HIRSCHL, Ran.  “Negative” Rights vs. “Positive” Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial  Interpretations 
of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order. Human Rights Quarterly, [s.l.], vol. 22, n. 4, p. 1060-
1098, 2000, p. 1071.
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public policies aimed at providing housing, social security, public education and other 
social rights would be availabe.  On the other hand, a constitutional scheme equipped 
with rigid limits to taxation (and, thus, a set of  “negative” rules for the protection of 
private property), would, hypothetically, be more compatible with the so-called first 
generation rights. Such a  logic, in the limit, could suggest crises.19 This would be be-
cause the absolute restraint of taxation (paroxysm rights of defense) would lead to zero 
ground for the effectiveness of  positive rights or a context of debt so intense that it 
would dissolve the Schumpeterian tax state into the debt state described by Streeck,20 
where the interests of creditors would take precedence over fundamental rights or de-
mocratic decisions.
It is possible, however, to go beyond this record and to argue that, as with the 
processes of state-building and democratization, the themes linked to public accounts 
are indecomposable from the whole debate about fundamental rights, which, in addi-
tion to the typologies that define them as “defense” or “performance”, they all reap the 
same deontological dignity. In this spirit, two books published at the beginning of the 
21st century and written under the influence of  liberalism are especially relevant.
Under the tax approach, L. Murphy and T. Nagel proposed that it makes no nor-
mative sense to affirm the notion of a “tax burden” or a “pre-tax income”, to be protected 
as a “defense” in the face of state taxation.21 On the one hand, from the factual and eco-
nomic point of view it is true that the modern state funds itself by extracting portions 
of private productive activity, governed by free enterprise and not directly controlled 
by bureaucracy.22 On the other hand, property is, rather than a fact of nature or a gift 
with metaphysical genesis, a proclaimed right, prescribed and guaranteed precisely by 
the state. Thus, the state consistently precedes property in a logical-legal approach, so 
that taxation cannot be understood merely as an immersion of sovereign power in an 
outside domain and for which it should, in principle, be omitted.23 Ownership, in its mo-
dern expression, associated with free enterprise and private choices about production, 
stems from a state-political environment that is indispensable for its recognition and 
maintenance. 
19  Hoffman and Norberg’s concept of fiscal crisis, in fact, concerns a framework in which there is a leap in 
public spending beyond the State’s ability to raise and borrow.
20  STREECK, Wolfgang. Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso, 2014.
21  MURPHY, Liam; NAGEL, Thomas Nagel. The Myth of Ownership: taxes and justice, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
22  OFFE, Claus. Theses on the Theory of the State. In: KEANE, John (Org.).  Contradictions of the Welfare 
State. London: Hutchinson, 1984, p. 120-121.
23  See: “Tax policy analysis needs to be emancipated from everyday libertarianism; it is an unexamined and 
generally  non-explicit assumption that does not bear examination, and it should be replaced by a concept 
of property rights as depending on the legal system that defines them. Since that system inludes taxes as an 
absolute essential part, the idea of prima facie property right in one´s pretax income – an income that could 
not exist without a tax-supported government – is meaningless” (MURPHY, Liam; NAGEL, Thomas Nagel. The 
Myth of Ownership: taxes and justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 36.)
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More recently, a depiction of capital, rather than just property, as a product of 
law,  in contrast with a “pure” economic fact, was developed  by Katharina Pistor. The 
legal theorist argues that wealth is the outcome of a legal codification, whose funda-
mental modules (property, contracts, bankruptcy, trusts and corporations) foster a set 
of privileges to an asset’s holder, related to law´s recognition of  the asset´s priority, 
durability, convertibility and  universality. All that legal codification is backed by the 
state´s coercive powers24. It seems to tacitly ratify the thesis that state precedes wealth 
and, coherently, tax comes before property, leading to the conclusion that the state po-
sitive performance in creating and protecting property is undetachable to its later “ne-
gative” non-intervention on it. A theory of fundamental rights grounded on this ideas 
would probably reinforce Nagel´s and Murphy´s arguments about property and taxes. 
Thus, before “negative” rights, every constitutional guarantee, no matter how 
liberal its remote origin may be, depends on a materially equipped and well maintained 
state apparatus that, under conditions of advanced capitalism, gathers its material con-
ditions for operation mainly through tax collection. The same state that relies on private 
production and the consent of the courts to collect the taxes that maintain it is the one 
that recognizes, guarantees and protects property. Therefore, there would be no nor-
mative precedence between the areas of private production / accumulation of wealth 
and extraction / taxation by the Government. In short, there would be no fundamental 
rights without the state, and there would be no constitutional state without taxes. 
Similar logic, but focused on public spending, is found in the theory of rights 
formulated by S. Holmes and C. Sunstein, to whom there are no “negative rights”. Every 
legislative prescription, according to the argument and the myriad of historical exam-
ples mobilized to back it, however classified as omissive, reflects state costs and expen-
ditures. Freedom of movement would at least require state authority to ensure some 
safety on the itineraries; freedom of expression presupposes the regulation of conduct 
such as slander and injury; property would need coercive remedies to protect it and 
courts to settle conflicts over it, and so on. Every right costs and is positive in the Hol-
mes and Sustein theory. Therefore, there is no constitutional provision exempt from 
tangible projection in the public budget.25
24  PISTOR, Katharina. The Code of Capital: how the law creates wealth and inequality. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2019.
25  HOLMES, Stephen; SUNSTEIN, Cass. The Cost of Rights: why liberty depends on taxes. New York: Norton 
& Company, 1999. In the same sense, an excerpt from an anthological article by J. Waldron, published even 
before Holmes and Sunstein’s book: “All serious political theorists recognize that protection is costly, and that 
therefore first generation – as much as economic entitlements – impose costs and raise questions about pri-
orities for us all”. (WALDRON, Jeremy. Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1993).
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As the examples addressed below suggest, a vast and influential portion of de-
mocratic theory and constitutional law theory, therefore, not only establishes a dialo-
gue with the field of public finance, but are materially grounded in conflicts and deci-
sions regarding taxation and the budget. Thus, the idea of creating an index that, based 
on public account numbers, measures the scope for the implementation of democratic 
decisions in each country, seems promising. The budgetary availability annually linked 
to the decision of the parliament representatives would in principle be the measure of 
the material extension of the democratic process and the promulgation or maintenan-
ce of rights.
This is precisely the proposal launched by Eugene Steuerle, a celebrated  eco-
nomist from the US, who held the presidency of the National Tax Association between 
2001  and 2002.26 With emphasis on the theoretical concept of fiscal democracy, whi-
ch refers to the availability of resources for rulers and parliamentarians instead take 
different courses of action, the author created, in collaboration with NYU economics 
professor Timothy Roeper, the Fiscal Democracy Index, or the Steuerle-Roeper Index. 
The initiative, however, finds its weaknesses when compared with an understanding 
of fundamental rights and democracy as equiprimordial. In the following sections, the 
characteristics of the index and their possible limits are more closely investigated.
3. DEMOCRACY IN NUMBERS: POTENTIALS OF THE FISCAL 
DEMOCRACY INDEX IN THE “AGE OF AUSTERITY”
Contemporary democracies, especially following the unfolding of the economic 
crisis that erupted in 2008, are precarious with regards to the means to implement ci-
tizens’ decisions in representative or participatory forums. Depleted, states can follow 
the exchange of rulers and political groups in the government posts (arche) without, 
however, finding ways to do things (kratos27)  in accordance with the wishes, prefe-
rences and choices expressed by citizens in electoral processes or social participation 
mechanisms28. 
The main challenge faced by contemporary constitutuional and democratic re-
gimes is no longer the elections or the possibilibity of public opinion´s influence on 
legislative procedures, but the avaiability of resources to fund its outcomes. A portent 
of such a historic scenario is the way how, rectifying his own theory of late capitalism´s 
26  STEUERLE, Eugene C. Dead Men Ruling: How to Restore Fiscal Freedom and Rescue our Future. New York: 
The Century Foundation Press, 2014, p. 1-18.
27  Further considerations on the meaning of the Greek terms “arche” and “kratos” can be found in OBER, Jo-
siah. The Original Meaning of “Democracy: Capacity to Do Things, not Majority Rule”. Constellations, [s.l.], vol. 
15, n. 1, p. 3-9, 2008.
28  SCHÄFFER, Armin; STREECK, Wolfgang. Introduction: Politics in the Age of Austerity. In SCHÄFFER, Armin; 
STREECK, Wolfgang (Org.).  Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p. 1-25.
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social crisis, Jürgen Habermas has recently written that “today we are not (yet?) expe-
riencing a legitimation crisis, but we are witnessing a palpable economic crisis”29.  The 
theme is recurrent in numerous theoretical and empirical contributions published sin-
ce 2008.
Schäfer and Streeck find a decrease in electoral participation in the Global Nor-
th, associated with the increase of state indebtedness, the maturation of the welfare 
state and the increase of public debts, in a context they define as “the age of austerity”. 
An apathetic electoral behavior would be manifested especially among people with 
less education and income, indicating a consequence of a scenario constituted by a 
demos in the absence of kratos.
Offe starts from the same empirical observation (drop in voter turnout under 
austerity policies) and rescues the political thinking of Schattschneider, a political 
scientist whose work, still in the mid-twentieth century, pointed out that the less privi-
leged strata no longer participate in the elections less for coercive reasons, but above 
all because they feel that their voices would not even be heard, regardless of the candi-
dates in which they voted.30 On this basis, Offe notes that the problem of contemporary 
democracies lies more in the supply of policies and rights in accordance with popular 
choices (kratos) than in the demand carried by means such as elections, protests and 
public opinion manifestations (demos).31 
With a focus on collective action and the paradoxical accentuation – at least in 
the Global North – of both protest and political apathy, Donatella Della Porta adjusts 
the Habermasian theory of crisis to the present reality and realizes that if, at the apex 
of the Social State, the political conflict would be related to the need for growing legiti-
macy for bureaucracies that increasingly intervened in society, the problems nowadays 
unfold from the alienation of the State, which is less capable in the midst of indeb-
tedness, loss of revenue, deregulation of economic activities and privatization.32 In this 
context, a “crisis of political responsibility” emerges, in which the jurisdictions tend to 
lose confidence in the States, which would negatively impact democracies.
This decline in democratic regimes as a problem associated with the fiscal inabi-
lity of indebted states and entangled in practices that erode their tax bases, such as tax 
29   HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Lure of Technocracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, p. 85.
30  OFFE, Claus. Participatory Inequality in the Austerity State: a supply side approach.  In:  SCHÄFER, Armin & 
STREECK, Wolfgang (Org.). Politics in the age of austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
31  Colin Hay notes that the equation of this debate according to the demand and supply categories is valid, 
but tends to be compressed in narrowly economistic terms. See: HAY, Colin. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007. Hence the choice in this article for demos and kratos in the definition rescued by Josiah Ober, “The 
Original Meaning of Democracy”.
32  DELLA PORTA, Donatella. Social movements in times of austerity: bringing capitalism back into protest 
analysis. Cambridge: Polity press, 2015, p. 110-156.
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competition,33 leading elections to lose their ability to impact governments to become 
anodyne spectacles,34 is fit for the development of some empirical measurement that 
estimates it quantitatively.
This is the scope of the Fiscal Democracy Index, whose premise is that demo-
cratic regimes “begin to creak and function poorly when previous decisions by dead or 
retired policymakers effectively curtail today´s and future generations of the power to 
make their own decisions”.35 The vicious cycle, from a democratic perspective, would lie 
in a prolonged granting of rights associated with upward spending and tax favors that 
lead the state to increased indebtedness. The present generations would be reduced 
to the condition of public debts payers, stripped of the possibility of influencing the 
direction of governments through their electoral manifestations.
Thought from the perspective of the United States´s public budget law, the in-
dex is algebraically intuitive and, according to its formulator, would have the merit of 
political neutrality, since it would consider both tax benefits (usually adopted by the 
right) and social rights (usually preferred by the left). Its formula is as follows: 1- [(com-
pulsory expenditures + interest on public debt) / income], multiplied by one hundred, 
for percentage conversion.36 Revenue decreases and increases in compulsory spen-
ding have, as it turns out, the same effect on reducing fiscal democracy as Steuerle 
conceived.
The previous section substantiated the theoretical premise that political-demo-
cratic and legal-constitutional conflicts comprise a necessary fiscal dimension. Thus, 
the contemporary debate on the crisis of constitutional democracies can be observed 
from public finances. This option has a triple potential: (i) from the theoretical point of 
view, it brings together the constitutional and political discussions of the taxation and 
budget realms, so as to allow an interdisciplinary connection between State, society 
and economy in social research; (ii) in a methodological dimension, the identification of 
problems in democratic regimes based on data emanating from public finances gives 
scientific research an objective view as much as possible, allowing for greater tangibility 
33  OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). Harmful Tax Competition: an emerg-
ing global issue, 1998, disponível em <https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf> Acesso em 
10/09/2018; GENSCHEL, Philipp; SCHWARZ, Peter. Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy. In: STREECK, W; 
SCHÄFER, A. (Org.). Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 59-83; DIETSCH, Peter; RIXEN, 
Thomas. Tax Competition and Global Background Justice. In: GOODIN, Robert E.; FISHKIN, James S. (Org.). Po-
litical Theory Without Borders. Sussex: Willey, 2016, p. 77-106.
34  CROUCH, Collin. Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity press, 2004.
35  STEUERLE, Eugene C. Dead Men Ruling: How to Restore Fiscal Freedom and Rescue our Future. New York: 
The Century Foundation Press, 2014, p. 8.
36  The index formula, in its algebraic expression, does not appear in any Eugene Steurle publication. Streeck 
and  Mertens present it and report in a statement that they got the information through personal communi-
cation with the US economist. See:  STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. Public Finance and the Decline of 
State Capacity in Democratic Capitalism. In: SCHÄFER, Armin & STREECK, Wolfgang (Org.). Politics in the age 
of austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p. 26-58.
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to diagnoses of the demos’ weakening power in today’s societies, and; (iii) as for the em-
pirical aspect, it is obtained with the abundance, comparability and availability of data 
on taxes and budgets.37 The work developed by Steuerle regarding the reality of the 
United States and adapted by Streeck and Mertens38 for Germany apparently contem-
plates these attributes to bring about a scientific contribution capable of algebraically 
simplifying and exposing in precise and easy to understand numbers the legal-political 
moment in which States prove to be materially incapable to operate in accordance with 
the collective will when it comes to promoting public policies or securing fundamental 
rights. 39
The Fiscal Democracy Index imparts empirical and methodological transpa-
rency to the diagnosis of States surrendered to the primacy of “permanent austerity”.40 
Their numbers, in fact, show a reduction in the discretionary margin of governments, 
with a drop of more than 40 percentage points in Germany and more than 60 in the US 
between 1970 and 2010.41
For political science, it is a precise indicator of the democratic decline within the 
Kratos, that is, the ability of collective decisions to be implemented. For constitutional 
law, it is a tangible and operable framework for informing dogmatic and hermeneutic 
debates about notions such as “reserve of possible” and “existential minimum.” There 
are, however, limitations and shortcomings in the formulation as outlined below.
4. THE STEUERLE-ROEPER INDEX DIFFICULTIES UNDER A 
CONSTITUTIONALIST LOOK: ABOUT THE NEXUS BETWE-
EN CONSTITUTIONAL AND BUDGETARY RIGIDITY
The preceding section presented the Fiscal Democracy Index as a tool capable of 
methodologically and empirically assisting the theoretical discussion of the problems 
37  MARTIN, Isaac Willian; MHEROTRA. Ajay K; PRASAD; Monica. The Thunder of History. In: MARTIN, Isaac Wil-
lian; MHEROTRA. Ajay K; PRASAD; Monica (Org.). The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and His-
torical Perspective. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, p. 1-27.
38   STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. Public Finance and the Decline of State Capacity in Democratic Cap-
italism. In: SCHÄFER, Armin & STREECK, Wolfgang (Org.). Politics in the age of austerity. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013, p. 26-58.
39   STEUERLE, Eugene. Restoring Fiscal Democracy. The Milken Institute Review, 1st Quarter, 2016, p. 26-35. 
Disponível em: https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/80326/2000781-Restoring-Fiscal-Demo-
cracy.pdf. Acesso em: 10 de julho de 2017.
40  See: “Changes in the global economy, the sharp slowdown in economic growth, the maturation of govern-
mental commitments, and population ageing all generate considerable fiscal stress. There is little reason to 
expect these pressures to diminish over the next few decades. If anything, they are likely to intensify.” PIERSON, 
Paul. Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State restructuring in Affluent Democracies. In: PIERSON, Paul 
(Org.). The New Politics of the Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 411.
41   STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. An Index of Fiscal Democracy, MPIFG Working Paper, [s.l.], vol. 10, 
n. 03, abr. 2010, p. 6-8. Disponível em: https://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp10-3.pdf.
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faced by democratic regimes in times of permanent austerity. There is, however, an 
omission in the index’s theoretical assumptions, whose apparent face is a myopia in the 
theory of fundamental rights. This problem compromises both the heuristic potential 
and the explanatory capacity of the numbers generated on the basis of the formula 
proposed by Steuerle, which influences studies in economics, public policy and even 
critical political science of notable European intellectuals, such as Wolfgang Streeck and 
Daniel Mertens, or Philip Genschel and Peter Schwarz.42
As we have seen, the numerator of Steuerle’s formula comprises indiscrimina-
tely government debt and other compulsory expenditure. This equation is anchored in 
theoretical difficulties that compromise it empirically and methodologically. Suppose, 
for example, that a central bank insulated from demos-franchised accountability de-
cides, less for strictly technical reasons and more for economic and political interests 
of the financial sector, to increase the interest premium paid for the purchase of go-
vernment bonds.43 In such a scenario, any reduction in social rights spending to meet 
the increased cost of debt service would be neutral from the perspective of the Fiscal 
Democracy Index. Taking the argument to its extreme, it is noted that a country where 
the entire budget is devoted to compulsory social security spending is as democratic 
as that which brings all the amounts collected with the payment of interest decided in 
spaces impervious to participation, representation or influence of the demos.
The relationship between numerator and denominator of the index also carries 
difficulties. Take, for example, a country that significantly reduces taxes on mobile bases 
and, as a result of the loss of revenue, also compromises social expenditures, keeping 
the debt servicing amounts constant. The index is not sensitive in relation to these 
changes in taxation, as long as they are offset by the reduction in mandatory spending. 
Thus, the vast empirical evidence and historical narratives  about the impact of tax in-
crease as an independent variable in democratization processes are diregarded.44
The theoretical flaw that produces the distortions identified above rests on the 
failure to consider, in the elaboration of the index, a common idea of modern constitu-
tionalism, according to which the fundamental rights are precisely what is subtracted 
from the ordinary democratic contentions. 
42  STREECK, Wolfgang; MERTENS, Daniel. An Index of Fiscal Democracy, MPIFG Working Paper, [s.l.], 
vol. 10, n. 03, abr. 2010, p. 6-8. Disponível em: https://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp10-3.pdf; GENSCHEL, Phi-
lipp; SCHWARZ, Peter. Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy. In: STREECK, W; SCHÄFER, A. (Org.). Politics in 
the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 59-83.
43   In Brazil, the political and economic interests, before an anodyne technical logic, influencing the fixing of 
the basic interest rate was discussed and sufficiently evidenced by Daniel Bin. See: BIN, Daniel. Macroeconom-
ic Policies and Economic Democracy in Neoliberal Brazil. Ecomomia e Sociedade, Campinas, vol. 24, n. 33, 
p. 513-539, 2015.
44  BASKARAN, Tushyantan. Taxation and Democratization. World Devolpment, v. 56, issue C, p. 287-301, 
2014.
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The relationship between fundamental rights and democracy informs a re-
lentless debate in the legal and political thinking of modernity. The pre-political nature 
of the natural property right grounded by Locke lays the foundation for the liberal em-
phasis on normative arrangements in relation to political processes.45 The thesis that 
the constitutive pact of political power is preceded by rights already present in the state 
of nature resonates in later times with the idea that constitutional predictions conform 
to aspects of sociability subtracted from democratic decision-making rites or, at least, 
subject to stricter procedural requirements for their promulgation or amendment.
Accordingly, in “A Theory of Justice”, Jonh Rawls had established, between topics 
36 and 38, the philosophical-legal bases of the liberal-egalitarian conception of consti-
tutionalism.46 The theme is taken up by the author in “Political Liberalism”, when discus-
sing the special relevance of fundamental freedoms.47 The argument of the Neo-con-
tractualist philosopher, who builds a conception of justice based on the counterfactual 
notions of original position and veil of ignorance, is that, in favor of priority due to fre-
edom, any restrictions on the right to political participation – for example, by means of 
greater rigidity in their procedures on fundamental issues – is justifiable. On Hobbesian 
anthropo-philosophical grounds in this regard, Rawlsian liberalism postulates that a 
harmonious society must admit that individuals have no confidence in the fulfillment 
of norms by others, unless a central and legitimate authority is established to coercively 
ensure them in favor of all. Admittedly, this authority must not rise to the point of beco-
ming  tyrannical and suppressing the very freedom that the  compliance to rules allows 
to maintain and prosper. The relationship between the principle of equal political par-
ticipation and juridical-constitutional constraints reveals itself as a specific variation of 
this larger theme, concerning the composition between individual free will, responsibi-
lity towards oneself and others, distrust and stabilization of relations by legal-coercive 
means.
Stephen Holmes goes on to note that protector-bound norms such as consti-
tutional rigidity go beyond, securing other freedoms of a non-political or participatory 
order. In fact, they allow the democratic process itself to be recognized, enhanced and 
legitimized. An example mobilized by the jurist and politologist in question is limited to 
freedom of communication and expression, whose social and deontological meaning 
reverberates over the conditions of political participation and thus enhances demo-
cracy itself. Provisions rigidly protected against the will of the volatile majorities can, 
rather than safeguard, boost democracy, as they give the decision-making process con-
fidence and the conditions for eventual decision-making failures occurring today to be 
45  LOCKE, John. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980.
46  RAWLS, John.  A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press 1999, p. 194-213.
47  RAWLS, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
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corrected tomorrow. A fallibilist notion of democracy, therefore, preserves the elements 
(such as rights of opposition and freedom of criticism, in a more obvious example) with 
which what is decided today may eventually be rectified tomorrow. The effect of this 
arrangement is greater confidence in democratic processes and thus the strengthening 
of this political regime.48
In other words, Stephen Holmes bases the thesis that the legal stiffening of the 
democratic process (used by the author around the tension between the passions of ci-
tizens and the necessary constraints of the social order) not only harmonizes other fre-
edoms (those that Constant would define as modern ones) with political freedoms, but 
promotes and strengthens them. The normative rigidity and the issuing of commands 
that forbid or limit eventual debates in political-representative scope are opportuni-
zing elements, rather than reducers, of democratic regimes.
If constitutionalism and the rigidity of legal norms are already understood as 
driving forces of democracy within the framework of liberalism, this conception dee-
pens into the Habermasian philosophical body, from which the deliberative normative 
model of democracy is built upon. Deliberative democracy, at least in its earliest for-
mulations, can be understood as a continuity, within the realm of the law and political 
philosophy, of the great philosophical project woven by Habermas in his “The Theory of 
Communicative Action”. Here the Frankfurt philosopher sought to compose a Weberian 
diagnosis of social rationalization under modern conditions with a civilizational orien-
tation towards the Marxian horizon of emancipation as nonreification and an influence 
of the philosophy of language on the construction of a philosophical anthropology on 
the basis of which work gives ground to symbol-mediated interactions as a distinctive 
feature of humanity. The social conflict fitting to late capitalism would lie not betwe-
en capital and labor, but between a free domain of informal communication and not 
driven by means, which Habermas engages with a redefined view of the Husserlian 
concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and the field of interactions, codified by the means of 
power or money, which lies in a redefinition of the Parsonian meaning of system. Des-
pite the potential for interactions between free and equal people in life-world, in con-
ditions of social complexity inherent in modernity, societies need to rely on generalized 
forms of reduction that ensure material (economy) and social (State) reproduction. The 
colonization imposed by the logic of the systems on the communicative webs of the 
life-world compresses, however, the rationality in means-end rational action, trimming 
that which is human from what defines it, namely the ability to establish communicati-
ve practices driven only by the non-coercive force of the best argument, and validated 
48  HOLMES, Stephen. Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1995.
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according to the demands from the sincerity of the sender, the truth of the statement 
and the normative adequacy in the bond established with the receiver.49
In “Between Facts and Norms,” Habermas advances on the above summarized 
philosophical project and finds in law the attribute of a hinge, a connecting element 
between system and life-world. In this arrangement, the communicative flows emana-
ting from the former it arrive at the logic of the latter, either for the regulation of the 
economy or the conformation of the bureaucratic activity of the State, by means of law. 
This is the element that prevents both chaotic communicative overload in the lifeworld 
and human reification in the strategic rationality of systems.
In the same effort, Habermas, consistent with the pragmatist legacy about his 
ideas, seeks to find a conception of political-legal subjectivity that seems equidistant 
between what he understands as a liberal self-contradictory individualism and an ethi-
cal overload proper to republican collective subjectivities .50
On this philosophical-political ground, the thesis of the equiprimordiality be-
tween fundamental rights (which Habermas understands as expressions of private au-
tonomy) and democracy (which the author associates with public autonomy and po-
pular sovereignty) thrives. Oblivious to all naturalistic metaphysics and ethically over-
burdened notions of general will, Habermas acknowledges that the foundation of the 
legitimacy of democratic decisions lies in the fact that they are proliferated in a delibe-
rative setting established between free and equal citizens who recognize themselves as 
such, so that “when citizens occupy the role of co-legislators they are no longer free to 
choose the medium in which alone they can realize their autonomy. They participate in 
legislation only as  legal subjects”.51 On the other hand, it is postulated, to the detriment 
of heteronomous determinations, that “the democratic procedure (…) alone provides 
legitimating force to the law”.52 The author admits a circularity in the way in which he 
bases fundamental rights and democracy, but asserts that this is the only non-meta-
physical way to legitimately postulate the political and normative ordering of plural 
and complex societies.53 Rigid fundamental rights, in short, are not restrictive factors, 
but conditions of possibility for democratic regimes. In conclusion, the leader of deli-
berative democracy states that “without basic rights that secure the private autonomy 
49  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. vol. 2: Lifeworld and System. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987. HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. vol. 1: Reason and Rationalization of 
Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
50  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democra-
cy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
51  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Inclusion of The Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1998, p. 260.
52  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Inclusion of The Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1998, p. 259.
53  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Concluding comments on empirical approaches to deliberative politics. Acta Politica, 
[s.l.], vol. 40, p. 384-392, 2005.
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of citizens there is also no medium for legally institutionalizing the conditions under 
which these citizens, as citizens of a state, can make use of their public autonomy.”54 
The Fiscal Democracy Index is short-sighted to the debate above. Now, if all fun-
damental rights, as justified in the preceding section, are necessarily and by definition 
projected at the level of public budgets, then the expected rigidity of constitutional 
norms must also resonate with regard to fiscal hardening, that is, the normative defini-
tion, preferably in constitutional matters, of compulsory expenses allocated to the cos-
ting of the most prestigious rights by the legal system. Thus, linking spending in fields 
such as education, health, and welfare — fundamental rights like any other, once the 
above-discussed Holmes and Sunstein theory has been adopted — are a driving force, 
rather than a limit to democracy.
To equate expenditures with public debt remuneration with budgetary alloca-
tions aimed at funding social, civil or political rights, as if they were all restrictions to 
democracy, clashes with the vast juridical-philosophical grounding on fundamental 
rights as conditions for the possibility of democracy, as formulated from the liberalism 
to deliberative democracy.
Brazilian constitutional law contains, for the purpose of this debate, an emble-
matic example, as developed in the following section.
5. FISCAL RIGIDITY, DEMOCRACY AND FUNDAMENTAL RI-
GHTS IN THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY
The debate about the theoretical problems of the Fiscal Democracy Index, re-
sulting from a myopia regarding the understanding of the mutual presupposition be-
tween democracy and fundamental rights, is clearer when discussed with reference to 
positive Brazilian constitutional law.
Unlike the US reality, which is the basis of Steuerle’s elaboration, the constitu-
tionalized budgetary law in Brazil does not take the compulsory expenses away from 
democratic scrutiny in Parliament or in participatory spaces. It is precisely because fun-
damental rights and democracy propel each other that the institutional imagination 
can go beyond the proposal of the suppression of social security rights or the diagno-
sis of “maturation of the Welfare State”, when it has to do with reconciling compulsory 
spending with popular sovereignty.55
54  HABERMAS, Jürgen. The Inclusion of The Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1998, p. 261.
55  STEUERLE, Eugene C. Dead Men Ruling: How to Restore Fiscal Freedom and Rescue our Future. New York: 
The Century Foundation Press, 2014, p. 1-18; Schäfer and Streeck, “Politics in the Age of Austerity”, 1-25.
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Take the example of Brazilian social security. On the one hand, there is a finalistic 
aspect in the commandment of the tax norms referring to the taxes defined in article 
195 of the Constitution as directed to the funding of fundamental rights such as health, 
social security and social assistance.56 On the other hand, this tightening of the budget 
does not preclude, with the assurance of resources without which the elderly, the sick 
and those who are in conditions of poverty could not even operate in the public sphere 
in conditions of parity, the establishment of a democratic discussion on expenses as-
sociated with the theme. There is, as stated in Article 165, paragraph 5, III of the Cons-
titution, a social security budget, discussed by the Parliament. In fact, once the budget 
in question is defined by the elected Legislative Houses, their management follows a 
participatory logic, counting on representatives of workers, employees, retirees and 
government, organized in councils, as determined by article 194, VII of the Constitu-
tion. This Brazilian constitutional arrangement, with all its nuances and complexities, 
escapes the Steuerle-Roeper index, which, short-sighted on fundamental rights theory, 
understands that social security rights and interest payments on public debt are equal, 
under the condition of compulsory spending as limiting factors of democracy.
The bottom line of liberal and deliberative constitutionalism is that in a country 
where the elderly have no security in their livelihoods, the sick do not know whether 
they will be able to afford the costs to be treated and the most vulnerable ones live 
below the minimum material conditions to assure their dignity, the private autonomy 
of the individuals that make up these groups is undermined to the extent that it makes 
the constitution of a democratic public space composed of free and equal persons un-
feasible. What Brazilian law adds to the debate is the creativity of constitutional engi-
neering that, while maintaining the mandatory nature of some expenses, opens the 
representative or participatory public scene for them to be allocated and managed de-
mocratically. The following considerations compose this example with the theoretical 
critique of the Steuerle-Roeper Index, in dialogue with a social ontology proper to the 
“age of austerity”, developed by Streeck.57
6. CONCLUSION
Today’s State lives under “permanent austerity.” In a context in which Schum-
peter’s dax State gives way to the debt State described by Streeck, democratic politics 
and constitutional arrangements referenced in fundamental rights seem at risk.58 The 
56  SPAGNOL, Werther Botelho. As Contribuições Sociais no Direito Brasileiro. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2002.
57  SCHÄFFER, Armin; STREECK, Wolfgang. Introduction: Politics in the Age of Austerity. In SCHÄFFER, Armin; 
STREECK, Wolfgang (Org.).  Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p. 1-25; STREECK, 
Wolfgang. Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso, 2014, p. 46-96.
58  STREECK, Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso, 
2014, p. 46-96.
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idea of measuring the atrophy of democracies by quantifying the unavailability of fiscal 
resources for the implementation of decisions preferred by citizens / voters seems me-
thodologically blissful in this context. The theoretical concept of fiscal democracy and 
its operationalization in an index that gives it empirical maneuverability offer, indeed, 
important tools for contemporary legal and social research. By not paying attention to 
the equiprimordiality between democracy and fundamental rights, however, the pro-
posal becomes unsuccessful and falls into a blind spot that prevents it from dealing 
with arrangements such as the Brazilian social security, by equalizing all sorts of man-
datory expenditure under the sign of the threat to democracy.
Before concluding, it turns out that there is a deeper theoretical explanation 
why fundamental rights and debt spending cannot be exchanged. Paradoxically, it is 
W. Streeck, a thinker who has adapted the Fiscal Democracy Index to the German rea-
lity, who provides the elements to explain this point. As seen in the previous section, 
in the work of Habermas there is no need to talk about democracy but in a society in 
which people are constituted as subjects of rights. Streeck, in his studies of the age of 
austerity, understands that the relationship established between state and creditors is 
ontologically distinct, since they do not engage in a democratic game. The subjects of 
law would integrate a social base defined by the author as “people´s constituency” or 
“Staatsvolk”. Creditors, on the other hand, would make up the “market constituency” or 
“Marktvolk”.59 The differences between these social bases are set out below.
Markets operate internationally and peoples are limited to borders. Markets 
have investors as their analytical unit who act as creditors, while peoples rely on ci-
tizens, who act mainly as voters. Markets claim credit prerogatives over public debt 
securities and peoples crave citizenship rights. Markets are continually heard in audien-
ces and people are mainly listened to through elections. Markets influence political 
decisions by fluctuating interest rates, while people do so by public opinion. Markets 
evaluate the state based on its ability to honor debt service, before guaranteeing rights 
such as health, education, transportation and housing.60
The theoretical track that leads from Holmes’s constitutional and legal philoso-
phy and follows through Habermas, addressed in the fourth section, to arrive at Stre-
eck’s social ontology, mentioned above, indicates that relations between subjects of 
law and State can be democratized and harmonized, with measures of constitutional 
rigidity aimed at guaranteeing fundamental rights. The Brazilian legal system attests to 
this possibility, as seen in the social security regime.
59  STREECK, Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso, 
2014, p. 81.
60  STREECK, Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. London: Verso, 
2014, p. 79-90.
FRANCISCO MATA MACHADO TAVARES
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 161-183, jan./abr. 2021.180 
The bond between State and creditors, on the other hand, is ontologically dis-
tinct and cannot be democratized or associated with the preservation of fundamental 
rights. Debt service and the costing of rights through fiscal hardening are not, therefore, 
equal obstacles to democracy, as Steuerle suggests with the Fiscal Democracy Index.61
Finally, the idea of composing an index that indicates the atrophy of sovereign 
powers in contexts of fiscal crisis, to the detriment of democracy, is salutary. This ende-
avor, however, must take into account the relationship of mutual determination betwe-
en public and private autonomy, so as not to reduce the theoretical status of expenditu-
res and fundamental rights to the same level as the payment of interest on public debt 
decided in insulated and hermetically separated agencies from instruments of vertical 
or social accountability. An interdisciplinary challenge to the sciences of economics, 
law and politics may, in fact, lie in constructing an index that circumvents the theoreti-
cal limits pointed out here in the Steuerle-Roeper Index.
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